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Abstract
We examine the functioning of financial markets when firms can invest in
socially responsible activities that produce an externality at a cost. We
examine a model in which some investors are altruistic in the sense that
they internalize the assets’ extra-financial performance when they value their
portfolio. There are two mechanisms by which these pro-social investors can
influence firm’s decisions. They can vote with their feet, thereby raising the
cost of capital of non-responsible firms. They can also try to get the majority
of shares to impose their view to the management. We also examine a model
in which there exists a large investor who can act strategically to influence
the beliefs of atomistic investors about his vote. We show that an increase in
the degree of pro-social motivation of the large investor may raise its purely
financial profit.
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, socially responsible invest-
ment, shareholder activism, asset pricing.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we examine the conditions under which the presence of al-
truistric investors could induce corporations to behave more responsibly.
Responsible behaviors are generating positive externalities (or less negative
externalities than their peers). These externalities are valued by altruistic
investors in proportion of their investment in the responsible firms. By alter-
ing their portfolio allocation towards responsible assets, altruistic investors
can decrease the equilibrium cost of capital of responsible firms, thereby
inducing them to behave more responsibly. However, this strategy can be
counterbalanced by other investors, who will rebalance their portfolio in fa-
vor of ”vice assets” because of their relative increase in expected return. To
better understand the relationship between corporate behavior and investors’
strategies, we explicitly consider that investors vote on corporate decisions.
This enables us to study how shareholders’ activism affects firm value.
We first derive the conditions under which socially responsible companies
have a higher market capitalization than non-responsible ones. Responsible
firms are more valued than non-responsible ones if socially responsible strate-
gies are not too costly for firms, and if the externality and the proportion of
altruistic investors are high enough. This shows that, in some circumstances,
there is a corporate social responsability (CSR) premium associated with the
fact that a company increases its level of CSR. The risk-adjusted return of
socially responsible assets however appears to be always lower than the one of
non-responsible assets. This is in line with the empirical results of Hong and
Kacperczyk (2008) who show that vice assets enjoy a higher risk-adjusted
return than other assets.
We then proceed to study under what conditions socially responsible in-
vestors can display a higher financial performance than non-responsible ones.
When the number of socially responsible investors and the externality are
high enough, and when responsible investors’ risk aversion and undiversifi-
able risk are low enough, socially responsible strategies are naturally adopted
by firms.1 This is because socially responsible investors hold a majority of
firms’ capital which enables them to control shareholders’ meetings. However,
when socially responsible investors do not hold a majority of firms’ shares,
1The size of the externality can also be interpreted as the strength of the consensus
around the CSR issues under consideration, in line with discussions in Landier and Nair
(2008).
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socially responsible behaviors are not adopted. This can be avoided thanks
to the intervention of a large socially responsible raider. This raider can buy
and hold non-responsible firms’ shares in an attemp to build a majority in fa-
vor of the socially responsible strategy. If he is not too risk averse, the raider
will succeed in acquiring a controlling block. The socially responsible strat-
egy is thus adopted at equilibrium. This can be associated with a positive
abnormal return for the socially responsible raider if he is able to sell back
part of the socially responsible firm and to pocket the CSR premium. This
will indeed be the case when the cost of implementing the socially responsible
strategy is low enough, and when the proportion of responsible investors and
the level of the positive externality are high enough. Such a strategy could
not be successfully implemented by a pure financial raider. Indeed, this raider
would like to announce that he will vote in favor of the socially responsible
strategy in order to pocket in the CSR premium. Since this announce is not
credible if he is a pure financial player, socially responsible investors are not
ready to pay a premium in order to buy firms’ share and the raider does not
display abnormal returns.
Overall, what is crucial in our framework for a socially responsible in-
vestor to be able to generate positive abnormal returns is: i) investing in
non-responsible firms, ii) acquiring enough shares to be pivotal during share-
holders’ meetings, iii) being sufficiently enclined towards social responsability
so that commitments to vote for costly increases in CSR are credible. These
ingredients are consistent with anecdotal evidence from the field. The acqui-
sition of TXU, a large Texas utility company, by two private equity firms,
KKR and TPG, was made possible thanks to the promise not to launch new
coal plants that would have dramatically increased the firm’s CO2 emissions.
This promise was made credible thanks to the endorsement of two environ-
ment protection institutes, EDF and NRDC, that were closely associated
with the deal. The endorsement by the two institutes can be interpreted as
a way for KKR and TPG to credibly commit to favor CSR.
One problem with the type of strategy we describe here is that it requires
to invest in non-responsible companies before making them more responsible.
This includes a reputational risk that some responsible investors, such as
large pension funds, are not always ready to take. We also show that purely
financial raiders can successfully acquire firms and make them less socially
responsible when the cost of CSR is high and when the proportion of socially
responsible investors and the level of the externality are low.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our
baseline model and equilibrium concept with competitive investors. Section
3 studies the impact of a large raider. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Asset pricing and corporate behaviors with
altruistic agents
Consider an economy with three dates and one firm. Firm’s assets are as-
sumed to already be in place. They initially belong to the owner of the firm,
who is going to sell them to atomistic investors. The risk-free rate is normal-
ized to 0. The firm yields a random financial return r per share. The return r
is normally distributed with mean Er, and variance σ2. There is a continuum
of investors with a mass of one such that
∫ 1
0
di = 1. Investors have a utility
function U (X) = −e−AX , in which A > 0 represents the constant absolute
risk aversion parameter. Investors initially hold no cash and no shares. We
denote by hi the number of shares held by investor i after trading at date 1.
The number of firm’s shares is normalized to 1, so that the market-clearing
condition is
∫ 1
0
hidi = 1. Investor i’s final wealth is written Wi = hi (r − P ).
The firm is confronted with a choice between two alternative strate-
gies. Strategy s = 0 has no social externality and its expected return is
Er (s = 0) = µ > 0. Strategy s = 1 generates a social externality which is
valued at e > 0 units of numeraire per share. The firm’s expected (financial)
return if the responsible strategy s = 1 is adopted is Er (s = 1) = µ− c > 0,
in which c > 0 represents firm’s financial cost of implementing the pro-social
activity. Another interpretation is that c is the cost to incur in order to reduce
a negative externality by e. We assume that e > c so that the responsible
strategy is desirable from a social point of view.2
Investors differ upon their level of altruism. When they evaluate the
performance of their investment, responsible investors internalize both the
financial and the extra-financial returns. This means that they evaluate the
return per share as µ − c − P + e for the responsible firm, and µ − P for
the firm implementing strategy s = 0. The remaining investors referred
to as standard investors do not value the externality. We use the dummy
2This is a crucial assumption. Socially responsible investment should require an acurate
cost-benefit analysis of the actions that are recommended by shareholder activists.
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variable xi to express pro-social values, where xi takes value 1 if investor i is
atruistic, and 0 otherwise. Responsible investors constitute a proportion pi
of the investors, which means that
∫
xidi = pi.
2.1 Demand and price with and without corporate re-
sponsibility
The demand for the firm’s shares and the equilibrium price is a function of
the investors’ expectations about the firm’s behaviour.
Let’s first consider the simple case where investors expect that the firm
will not implement a pro-social behaviour: s = 0. Thus, all investors solve
the same one-riskfree-one-risky portfolio choice problem in which we know
that the Arrow-Pratt approximation for the certainty equivalent final wealth
is exact. Thus, they all select h that maximizes h(µ− P )− 0.5h2σ2A. This
yields h∗i (s = 0) = (µ−P )/σ2A. The market-clearing condition implies that
h∗i = 1 for all i, which implies that
P (s = 0) = µ− Aσ2.
Since the firm generates no externality, the pricing equation reflects only the
risk-return tradeoff, and the holding equation indicates that all agents hold
the same portfolio.
Suppose alternatively that investors believe that the firm will implement
the responsible behaviour. Investor i’s optimization program is:
max
hi
EU((r − P + xie− c)hi) = U((µ− c− P + xie)hi − A
2
h2iσ
2).
It yields the following demand for firm’s shares:
hi =
µ− c+ xie− P
Aσ2
.
Market-clearing imposes
∫ 1
0
hidi = 1. The firm’s share price is thus equal to:
P (s = 1) = µ− Aσ2 + pie− c.
As before, this pricing equation reflects the basic tradeoff between return
and risk: the share price equals the expected return corrected for risk (dis-
counted at the risk-free rate of zero). One difference with a classic asset
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pricing formula is the fact that, due to responsible investors, the share price
incorporates part of the firm’s externality.
At equilibrium, after-trading holdings are given by:
hi (s = 1) = 1 +
(xi − pi)e
Aσ2
, foralli.
The responsible investors invest more in the responsible firm than non-
responsible investors. Their additional investment increases with the level
of the positive externality and decreases with their level of risk aversion and
the level of risk.
The above pricing and holdings equations suggest that responsible in-
vestors can display a higher expected rate of return than no-responsible ones.
Indeed, the expected financial performance of the firm is Er(s = 1) − P,
which is equal to Aσ2 − pie. If this is positive, responsible investors invest
more in the responsible firm which offers a higher expected rate of return than
the risk free asset. But the reality is that the firm’s equity return does not
compensate enough for the risk. Responsible investors receive an additional
compensation from the social return of the firm.
Our pricing results show that the firm’s share price is higher when the
socially responsible strategy is adopted if and only if pie > c, that is, if
the proportion of responsible investors and the size of the externality are
sufficiently high, and if the cost of implementing the pro-social strategy is low
enough. Otherwise, the share price of the firm if it responsible is lower. This
result can explain why extant empirical studies (see, for example, Wagner,
2001) disagree on the impact of CSR on firm value.
2.2 Voting-with-our-feet equilibrium
In this section, we assume that before selling the firm, the initial owner is able
to fix s irreversibly. Once s is selected, the owner sell the firm to atomistic
investors who cannot change s. This implies that the initial owner of the firm
selects the degree of corporate responsibility to maximize its market value.
The owner knows that if the socially desirable investment is not performed,
responsible investors will reduce their demand for its shares. That will have
an adverse effect on its market value and on its cost of capital, which will
have to be weighted with the cost c to invest more responsibly.
5
Definition 1 A voting-with-our-feet equilibrium is defined by a vector (P ∗, s∗, h∗i )
such that
1. Optimal portfolio allocation: h∗i ∈ arg maxEU ((r − P ∗ + s∗(xie− c))hi);
2. Market clearing condition:
∫ 1
0
h∗i di = 1;
3. The firm invests responsibly if it increases its market value.
We have seen above that the market value of the firm is µ−Aσ2 +pie− c
and µ − Aσ2 respectively if it invests responsibly or not. Thus, we obtain
that s∗ = 1 if and only if pie is larger than c, or pi ≥ c/e. This is the case
if the proportion of responsible investors is large, or if the social benefit-cost
ratio is large.
Proposition 1 There are two possible voting-with-our-feet equilibria. When
pi is smaller than c/e, the firm does not behave responsibly, P ∗ = µ−Aσ2, and
all investors hold the same portfolio. Otherwise, the firm behaves responsibly,
P ∗ = µ − Aσ2 + pie − c, and responsible investors hold more of the firm’s
equity in their portfolio than the standard investors.
The underlying incentive mechanism is simple: the credible threat of
responsible investors to reduce their investment in the firm if it does not
behave responsibly provides an incentive for corporate social responsibility.
Indeed, it reduces the market value of irresponsible firms. In other words, it
raises their cost of capital. The incentive scheme is made stronger when the
proportion of pro-social investors increases on the market. Notice however
that the incentive is too weak in the sense that it may be possible that a
socially desirable investment (e > c) is not implemented because doing so
would reduce the market value of the firm (pie < c).
We can try to give numbers here. In the Stern Review (2007), the dam-
age generated by the emission of greenhouse gases in the business-as-usual
scenario is estimated to be equivalent to an immediate and permanent loss of
the world GDP by an amount comprised between 5% and 20%. At the same
time, Stern estimates that most of these consequences could be eliminated
by sacrificing immediately and permanently 1% of the world GDP, invested
in alternative/new technologies to reduce emissions. Thus, for the applica-
tion of climate change, we can estimate the ratio c/e to somewhere between
6
5% and 20%. This suggests that social efficiency could be obtained in the
voting-with-our-feet equilibrium if the proportion of altruistic investors is
larger than this threshold around, say, 10%.
2.3 Equilibria with shareholder activism
Investors can vote with their feet. They can also intervene directly through
shareholder activism. To make this possible, let us modify the timing of
the game. At date 1, investors purchase the firm’s shares at price P . At
date 2, the general assembly of the corporation votes on a proposal to invest
more responsibly on the basis of one-share-one-vote. At date 3, returns are
realized. We denote by vi the vote of agent i for each share he holds in the
firm. vi = 1 corresponds to a vote in favor of s = 1 and vi = 0 to a vote
in favor of s = 0. The aggregate vote in favor of strategy s = 1 is defined
as v =
∫ 1
0
vihidi. The majority rule implies that, if v ≥ 12 , the pro-social
strategy s = 1 is adopted. Otherwise, the firm adopts the purely financial
strategy.
Since investors are atomistic, they are never pivotal in the vote on cor-
porate strategy. As a result, any voting outcome can be sustained at equi-
librium. However, investors have rational expectations and anticipate what
the outcome of the vote will be depending on the share of the various types
of investors in the firm’s capital. This enables them to derive their demand
for assets. We assume that, at equilibrium, investors coordinate on the same
equilibrium.
We define an intuitive voting strategy as a voting rule in which investors
vote according to their preferences: responsible investors vote for the pro-
social strategy s = 1 while standard investors vote for the purely financial
strategy s = 0.
Definition 2 A shareholder-activism equilibrium is defined by a vector (P ∗, s∗, h∗i , v
∗
i )
such that
1. Optimal portfolio allocation: for all i : h∗i ∈ arg maxEU ((r − P ∗ + s∗(xie− c))hi);
2. Market clearing condition:
∫ 1
0
h∗i di = 1;
3. Corporate strategy of the firm: s∗ = 1 if v∗ =
∫ 1
0
v∗i h
∗
i di ≥ 12 , and s∗ = 0
otherwise, with v∗i = xi.
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Condition 1 states that the two types of investors are choosing optimal
portfolios given the corporate strategy that is expected to be selected at equi-
librium. Condition 2 is the market clearing condition. Condition 3 indicates
that we focus on equilibria with intuitive voting strategies.
Let us consider first the equilibrium in which it is expected that the
activist’s proposal to invest more responsibly will be defeated at the general
assembly. As we already know, this implies that all investors, altruistic or
not, invest one unit h∗i = 1 in the firm, which implies that P
∗ = µ − Aσ2.
We now verify under what condition this equilibrium exists. To do so, we
need to verify that the condition v∗ < 1
2
holds. Because all investors hold
the same number of shares, the proportion of votes in favor of the pro-social
strategy is the same as the proportion of altruistic agents in the economy.
Thus, s∗ = 0 is an equilibrium if and only if pi is smaller than 1/2. The
equilibrium in which the firm chooses the purely financial strategy exists if
and only if a majority of investors is not responsible.
Let us now consider the alternative equilibrium in which it is expected
that the activist’ proposal will get a majority vote at the general assembly.
We know that this implies that
h∗i = 1 +
(xi − pi) e
Aσ2
, (1)
and
P ∗ = µ− Aσ2 + pie− c.
We now verify under which condition this equilibrium exists. To do so, we
need to find the condition under which s∗ = 1 is actually chosen at the voting
stage, that is, the condition under which v∗ =
∫
xih
∗
i di ≥ 12 . Given equation
(1), this is true iff
v∗ = pi
(
1 +
(1− pi) e
Aσ2
)
≥ 1
2
. (2)
From this equation, we see that the proportion v∗ of shares hold by pro-
social investors is larger than their proportion pi on the market, since they
hold proportionally more of the responsible asset in their portfolio. Thus it
may be possible that the activists’ proposal succeeds in the general assembly
in spite of the fact that there is a minority of altruistic agents on the market.
This is more likely to be the case if e/Aσ2 is large.
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Proposition 2 There are two possible shareholder-activism equilibria. When
v∗, which is defined by (2), is smaller than 1/2, the firm does not behave re-
sponsibly, P ∗ = µ− Aσ2, and all investors hold the same portfolio. When pi
is larger than 1/2, the firm behaves responsibly, P ∗ = µ−Aσ2 + pie− c, and
responsible investors hold more of the firm’s equity in their portfolio than the
standard investors. When pi ≤ 1/2 ≤ v∗, the two equilibria coexists.
When pi ∈
[
1
2
(
1 + (1−pi)e
Aσ2
)−1
, 1
2
]
, the two intuitive equilibria character-
ized above exist; the prevalence of one equilibrium instead of another depends
on whether investors coordinate their anticipations on the responsible strat-
egy being chosen or not.
3 Activism of a large investor
This section studies what could be the role and financial performance of a
large investor, referred to as a raider, who stands ready to trade large stakes
in firms.
We introduce a date 0 in our model. We assume that the initial owner
wants to sell the assets for exogenous liquidity reasons at date 0 or 1. The
formal objective of the initial owner of the firm is to maximize the proceeds
from sales by choosing the date at which the sale occurs. If the sale occurs
at date 0, the initial owner gets P0. If the initial owner sells at date 1 directly
to investors, the owner gets P1 (we do not need to introduce any expectation
operator since, at equilibrium, P1 is perfectly anticipated), with P1 being
determined as in the previous section. As before, P1 depends on whether
responsible investors have or not a majority of votes. Dates 1, 2, and 3
proceed as in section 2.3.
At date 0, a risk-neutral raider stands ready to acquire the firm’s financial
assets. In order to do so, he makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the initial
owner.3 His level of social responsability is denoted by θ ∈ [0, 1], where θ
represents the proportion of the externality that he internalizes. We denote
3The initial owner not being atomistic alleviates the free-rider problem, analyzed by
Grossman and Hart (1980), that a raider would face when trying to buy shares from atom-
istic investors. In order to solve this free-rider problem, we could have instead considered
that the raider’s offer is conditional on the fact that all shares are tendered.
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by α the proportion of the firm’s shares that the raider does not sell at date
1. If the raider buys firm’s shares, he thus resells a proportion 1− α at date
1 at a price denoted P1. The remaining α shares are held. The α shares
entitle the raider to vote on firm’s corporate strategy at date 2. His vote
is denoted V , with V = 1 if the raider votes for the responsible strategy
and V = 0 otherwise. EtUR represents raider’s expected utility conditional
on information available at date t. Raider’s expected utility at date 2 is
E2UR = (1− α)P1 + α (µ+ s(θe− c)) − P0: After purchasing the firm at
price P0, he sells a fraction 1− α at price P1 and retains a fraction α, whose
expected return is µ if the firm does not behave responsibly. It it does, the
financial return is reduced by c. But the raider also takes into account of a
fraction θ of the extra-financial return e of its investment in that case.
Definition 3 An equilibrium is defined by a vector (P ∗0 , P
∗
1 , s
∗, α∗, h∗i , v
∗
i , V
∗)
such that
1. Atomistic investors’ optimal portfolio allocation:
for all i, h∗i ∈ arg maxEU ((r − P ∗ + s∗(xie− c))hi);
2. Market clearing condition:
∫ 1
0
h∗i di = 1− α∗;
3. Corporate strategy of the firm: s∗ = 1 if v∗ = α∗V ∗ +
∫ 1
0
v∗i h
∗
i di ≥ 12 ,
and s∗ = 0 otherwise, with v∗i = xi.
4. Take-it-or-leave-it offer from the raider to the initial owner: P ∗0 ≥ P ∗1 ;
5. Large investor’s optimal portfolio allocation: α∗ ∈ arg maxE1UR (s∗) ;
6. Large investor’s voting strategy: V ∗ = 1 if E2UR (s∗ = 1) ≥ E2UR (s∗ = 0),
and V ∗ = 0 otherwise.
The first three conditions are interpreted as in the previous section. A
difference is that the number of shares available for investors is 1−α instead
of 1. This changes the risk premium and the level of investors’ holdings in
the firm. Condition 4 requires that the raider proposes the initial owner a
price that is at least higher than what the owner would get if he were to sell
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shares directly to investors at date 1.4 Condition 5 indicates that the raider
chooses at date 1 how many shares he wants to hold up to date 3 such that
he maximizes his expected utility (anticipating the strategy that is adopted
at date 2). Finally, condition 6 indicates that the raider votes at date 2 for
the strategy that maximizes his expected utility. We solve for the intuitive
equilibrium by backward induction.
At date 2, the raider holds α∗ shares, responsible investors hold
∫
xih
∗
i di,
and standard investors hold the remaining shares. Raider’s expected utility
is E2UR = (1− α∗)P ∗1 + α∗ (µ+ s∗(θe− c))− P ∗0 . If the raider is pivotal, he
votes in favor of the responsible strategy if and only if:
(1− α∗)P ∗1 + α∗ (µ+ θe− c)− P ∗0 ≥ (1− α∗)P ∗1 + α∗µ− P ∗0 ,
or equivalently, if θe ≥ c, or θ ≥ c/e. This inequality suggests that, at the
voting stage, the raider votes in favor of the responsible strategy if he is
sufficiently responsible and if the cost-benefit ratio of the responsible invest-
ment is sufficiently favorable. This is the case because, since it is financially
damageable to implement the socially responsible strategy, the raider votes
in favor of this strategy only if he experiences enough additional utility from
the increase in social responsability.
3.1 Large investor’s activism towards more responsi-
bility
We focus first on the case in which pi < 0.5 (1 + (1− pi) e/Aσ2)−1: absent
raider’s intervention, the responsible strategy is not adopted at the intuitive
equilibrium. In this case, the raider proposes a price:
P ∗0 = µ− Aσ2. (3)
The initial owner cannot do better than accepting the offer, since µ − Aσ2
is the competitive price when the firm does not invest responsibly, in the
absence of the large investor. We hereafter examine an equilibrium in which
the large investor holds enough shares of the firm and is altruistic enough to
4The take-it or leave-it offer gives all the bargaining power to the raider. Other less
extreme bargaining mechanisms would leave some surplus to the initial owner. This issue
is not important from a theoretical viewpoint since all the results in this section hold as
long as the raider captures some of the surplus.
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reverse the majority in favour of investing responsibly. To do this suppose
that all investors anticipate this. As observed above, this equilibrium requires
that θe be larger than c, otherwise the large investor will never vote in favour
of more responsiobility.
Because the raider only releases 1−α∗ shares on the market, after-trading
holdings are given by h∗i = 1 − α∗ + (xi − pi) e/Aσ2, for all i. The same
computations as in section 2.1 shows the market-clearing condition
∫ 1
0
h∗i di =
1− α holds if
P ∗1 = µ+ pie− c− (1− α)Aσ2. (4)
At date 1, if the raider expects to be pivotal and change the firm’s strat-
egy towards more responsability, his expected utility is given by: E1UR =
(1− α)P ∗1 + α (µ+ θe− c)− P ∗0 . In this case, the optimal amount of shares
that he keeps after trading at date 1 is the one that maximizes E1UR. Re-
placing P ∗1 by its expression above and solving yields
α∗ = 1− (pi − θ)e
2Aσ2
. (5)
Is it enough to hold a majority in favour of the responsible strategy at date
2? That is, is the following condition
α∗ +
∫
xih
∗
i di ≥
1
2
satisfied? This inequality may be rewritten as
1− (pi − θ)e
2Aσ2
+ pi
(pi − θ)e
2Aσ2
+ pi
(1− pi)e
Aσ2
≥ 1
2
.
This is equivalent to
−(1− pi)(pi + θ)e
2Aσ2
≤ 1
2
,
which is always true. Thus, equation (5) characterizes the optimal holding
strategy of the large investor, which implies that the firm always behaves
responsibly. When θ = pi, we obtain that α∗ = 1. Indeed, this is a situation
in which the expected total return of the firm is evaluated in the same way
by the two types of non-standard investors. Because atomistic ones are risk-
averse, the only possible equilibrium price is P ∗1 = µ+ θe− c, and atomistic
investors have a zero net demand for the firm’s shares. The large investor
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sells some of its shares at date 1 only if its degree of altruism θ is smaller than
the proportion pi of altruistic agents in the population of atomistic investors.
This is a situation in which the relatively lower degree of altruism of the large
investor is compensated by its smaller degree of risk aversion to characterize
the equilibrium transaction of shares at date 1. The larger the difference
pi− θ or the smaller the risk premium Aσ2, the smaller is the share α∗ of the
firm retained by the large investor.
Proposition 3 Suppose that pi < 0.5 (1 + (1− pi) e/Aσ2)−1 and θ ≥ c/e.
Then, the intuitive equilibrium is such that
• (date 0) the initial owner sells the firm to the large investor at the low
price P ∗0 = µ− Aσ2;
• (date 1) the large investor sells a fraction 1 − α∗ = (pi − θ)e/2Aσ2 of
the firm to atomistic investors at price
P ∗1 = µ+ pie− c− 0.5(pi − θ)e.
Atomistic investor i holds a fraction h∗i = 1 − α∗ + (xi − pi) e/Aσ2 of
the firm;
• (date 2) Altruistic atomistic investors and the large investor vote in
favor of the proposal to invest more reponsibly, which gets the majority;
• the equilibrium expected profit for the large investor is
E1UR = Aσ2 +
(pi − θ)2e2
4Aσ2
+ (θe− c) ≥ 0. (6)
The expected total profit of the large investor is expressed in equation
(6). The first source of profit is the risk premium Aσ2 that is ripped from the
initial take-it-or-leave-it offer. The second source comes from the trading of
shares with atomistic investors who have a degree of altruism that is different
from the large investor’s degree of altruism. We refer to this term as the ”re-
sponsibility premium”. The third source is the extra-financial performance
θe− c.
It may be useful to examine the benefit of this strategy compared to the
one in which the large investor would instead vote against the responsible in-
vestment. If he intends to vote for the non-responsible strategy, his expected
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utility is E2UR = (1− α)P ∗1 + αµ− P ∗0 . In this case, P ∗1 = µ− (1− α)Aσ2,
and α∗ = arg maxα E2UR = 1. It yields E1UR = Aσ2. This equilibrium is
described in the following proposition
Proposition 4 Suppose that pi < 0.5 (1 + (1− pi) e/Aσ2)−1 and θ < c/e.
Then, the intuitive equilibrium is such that
• (date 0) the initial owner sells the firm to the large investor at the low
price P ∗0 = µ− Aσ2;
• (date 1) the large investor does not sell shares at date 1, and the
price of shares is P ∗1 = µ. Atomistic investor i holds a fraction
h∗i = (xi − pi) e/Aσ2 of the firm;
• (date 2) The large investor does not implement the responsible invest-
ment;
• the equilibrium expected profit for the large investor is
E1UR = Aσ2 ≥ 0. (7)
The net benefit of strategy V ∗ = 1 is thus obtained by comparing this
expected profit described by equations (6) and (7). It yields a total benefit
of corporate social responsibility
(θe− c) + (pi − θ)
2e2
4Aσ2
≥ 0. (8)
The first term of the left hand-side of this inequality represents the utility
gain from the social responsability of the firm. The second term is the re-
sponsibility premium, i.e., the capital gain made by the raider when he sells
back shares on the market at date 1 given his credible commitment to vote
in favor of more corporate social responsibility. They are both positive. It
can be positive even when θe is smaller than c. However, the large investor
is unable to credibly commit on the strategy to vote in favor of corporate
social responsibility. Atomistic altruistic investors know that, which induces
them to reduce their demand for the asset at date 1. This eliminates the
possibility to extract the capital gain expressed by the second term in the
LHS of equation (8).
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Observe also that an increase in the degree of altruism of the large in-
vestor may increase its purely-financial profit. There is an upward jump in
profitability when θ increases from below to above threeshold c/e. If the
raider is not sufficently socially responsible, θ < c
e
, he votes for the non-
responsible strategy at date 2, this is rationnally anticipated by investors at
date 1. As a consequence, the price of shares at date 1 is not high enough to
induce the raider to sell any of his shares: he keeps his entire holdings up to
date 3 and has an expected wealth of Aσ2. If instead the raider is sufficiently
socially responsible, θ ≥ c
e
, he votes for the responsible strategy at date 2.
Anticipating this, investors are ready to pay a high price to buy the shares
at date 1. The raider then sells an amount 1−α∗ = (pi− θ)e/2Aσ2 at date 1
to benefit from this high price. In general, he cannot sell his entire holdings
for two reasons. On the one hand, if he sells a lot of shares on the market,
investors have to bear more risk and this reduces the price. On the other
hand, if he sells too many shares, he is no more pivotal. The optimal finan-
cial performance of the large investor is increased by (pi−θ)2e2/4Aσ2 when θ
crosses thresold c/e. This is because the large investor is then able to modify
the beliefs of altruistic small investors about corporate social responsibility.
We thus conclude that responsible raiders display a better financial per-
formance than non-responsible ones if θ is larger than c/e. The underlying
economic intuition for this result is that the raider’s social responsability en-
ables him to credibly commit on voting adequately once he has established
a controlling position. The non-responsible raider would also like to pretend
that he is going to vote adequately in order to resell part of his holdings
at an inflated price. However, such a signal by the non-responsible raider
would not be credible since, after having pocketed the responsibility pre-
mium, voting in favor of the responsible strategy would translate into lower
returns for him. Since voting is assumed to occur after the raider has pock-
eted the responsibility premium, it would be beneficial for him to deviate
from his announced voting strategy in order to increase further his profits.
This translates into the fact that, unless the non-responsible raider can cred-
ibly commit to vote for the costly responsible strategy, he cannot replicate
the high financial performance of the responsible raider. As discussed in the
introduction, the alliance between private equity funds, such as KKR and
TPG, with environment protection institutes, such as EDF and NRDC, can
be explained by the willingness of financially oriented funds to enhance the
credibility of their socially responsible commitments. Such an increase in
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socially responsible credibility can be beneficial when the higher firm market
capitalization it induces more than compensates the additional financial cost
of pursuing socially responsible strategies. This is the case when the cost of
implementing the socially responsible strategy, investors’ risk aversion, and
the level of risk are low enough, when the level of the externality are high
enough, or when the discrepancy of the intensity of altruism between the
large investor and the representative small investor is large enough.
3.2 Large investor’s activism towards less responsibil-
ity
The mechanism for corporate change that we describe in the previous section
can also be directed towards less social responsability: a raider could take
control of a firm to turn its strategy from responsible to non-responsible. We
derive in this section the circumstances in which this can happen. The inter-
pretations are symmetric so we restrict here our attention to the condition
of existence of such a scenario.
We now focus on the case in which pi > 1
2
: absent a raider’s intervention,
the responsible strategy is adopted at the intuitive equilibrium. In this case,
in order to buy shares from the initial owner, the raider proposes a price:
P ∗0 = µ− c+ pie− Aσ2.
The initial owner cannot do better than accepting the offer.
At date 1, if the raider expects to be pivotal and change the firm’s strat-
egy towards less responsability, his expected utility is given by: E1UR =
(1− α)P ∗1 + αµ − P ∗0 . The same computations as in the previous section
shows that P ∗1 = µ− (1− α)Aσ2. In this case, the optimal amount of shares
that he keeps after trading at date 1 is α∗ = arg maxα E1UR = 1, that is,
the raider keeps all the shares. This is because, given his risk neutrality, it
would not make sense for the raider to sell the risky shares to risk averse
investors. Obviously, this makes him pivotal for the firm’s decision. As ex-
plained earlier, he votes against more responsibility if θ is smaller than c/e.
This equilibrium is sustained by price P ∗1 = µ.
Proposition 5 Suppose that pi > 1/2, θ < c/e and Aσ2 ≥ pie− c. Then, the
intuitive equilibrium is such that
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• (date 0) the initial owner sells the firm to the large investor at the low
price P ∗0 = µ+ pie− c− Aσ2;
• (date 1) the large investor does not sell shares at date 1, and the price
of shares is P ∗1 = µ ≥ P ∗0 . Atomistic investors do not hold any share
of the firm;
• (date 2) the single shareholder votes against the proposal to invest more
reponsibly;
• the equilibrium expected profit for the large investor is
E1UR = Aσ2 − (pie− c) ≥ 0. (9)
Overall, if the raider is not socially responsible in the sense that θ < c
e
,
he has an interest in buying and holding the firm’s shares, and in voting for
the non-responsible strategy. By assuming that Aσ2 is larger than pie − c,
the equilibrium price P ∗0 = µ + pie − c − Aσ2 in the absence of the large
investor is smaller than µ, which is the large investor’s valuation of the firm
if he could reverse the pro-social strategy of the firm. This is actually done
by purchasing and retaining 100% of the firm’s shares.
This section shows that firms that are socially responsible might be the
targets of takeovers by non-responsible raiders. This occurs when the propor-
tion of responsible investors and the level of externality are low, and when
the cost of corporate social responsability, investors’ risk aversion and the
level of risk are high. The idea for purely financial raiders is to profit from
the low share price that prevails for responsible firms in this case.
4 Conclusion
This paper studies asset pricing and corporate governance when some in-
vestors have altruistic preferences. In this case, the externalities generated
by a firm are partially incorporated into its share price. When investors differ
in their degree of altruism, there is a conflict of interest between the potential
shareholders of the firm over corporate social responsability. To resolve this
conflict, we consider that investors vote between a strategy that is financially
profitable for the firm and a strategy (the responsible strategy) which is less
financially profitable but is desirable from a social point of view.
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We first study a situation in which investors are atomistic. We determine
under what circumstances corporate social responsability will be favored by
the shareholders of the firm. We show that this is the case if the externality
and the proportion of altruistic investors are large enough, and if investors’
risk aversion and the level of risk are low enough. When it is not the case,
at equilibrium, the purely financial strategy is adopted after the vote. When
the cost of the responsible strategy is low enough, the market capitalisation
of the firm is higher if it is socially responsible.
We focus on this case and study the impact of a large investor who stands
ready to acquire a pivotal stake in the firm. This large investor may acquire
the company when it is non-responsible and turn it into responsible. This
enables him to sell back part of his holdings at a higher price to socially
responsible investors. He may not sell all his shares because he has to be
pivotal at the future shareholder meetings. The profitability of this raid
crucially depends on the fact that the large investor is himself or herself
socially responsible.
This paper offers some theoretical support to the claim that socially re-
sponsible investors can enjoy a higher stock market performance than non-
responsible investors. We show that this higher performance requires to
not only invest in but also take control of non-responsible firms to turn them
into responsible ones. Our theory predicts that the higher risk-adjusted stock
market returns go along with a decrease in the firm financial performance
but an increase in its social performance.
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